Attackers abused trusted Qubole IAM roles to download data from AWS S3 buckets
- Severity
- High
- Sources
- 1
What happened
Activity ran from 14 to 26 October 2026 and abused legitimate cross-account trust policies for Qubole integration roles in customer AWS accounts; no CVE or software vulnerability is involved. Requests came first via Mullvad VPN and then mainly from an OVH-hosted server, all with a valid External ID. Wiz recommends reviewing CloudTrail from 1 October 2026 across every account with a Qubole role, revoking active sessions, rotating accessible secrets, and removing unused integrations. Enable S3 data events, since management events do not record object reads. Treat External IDs as non-secret identifiers.
For security analysts · Written by AI from 1 source · Wrong?
What to do
- Revoke active sessions for any abused integration role and remove unused Qubole integrations.
- Rotate every secret, parameter and credential-bearing Lambda variable that the role could reach.
- Restrict trusted principals and source networks, and do not treat External IDs as passwords.
Written by AI from the sources, checked against them
Full story timeline · 1 update
Who reported · 1 outlet
Who and what is in it
Malware