Attackers abuse Qubole integrations to steal secrets and data from AWS customers
- Severity
- High
- Sources
- 1
What happened
Wiz reports a supply-chain campaign from 14 October, plus a separate Qubole-linked campaign on 8 to 11 October. The attacker used IAM user AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS from Qubole AWS account 805246085872 to call sts:AssumeRole against customer integration roles, then added a second IAM user on 18 October. Rotating credentials does not end sessions already issued, so defenders should revoke active role sessions, rotate every secret, parameter and Lambda environment variable the roles could read, and review CloudTrail from 1 October for AssumeRole events with userIdentity.accountId 805246085872, especially from non-AWS IP addresses. No CVE is cited.
For security analysts · Written by AI from 1 source · Wrong?
What to do
- Rotate credentials for any integration you have with Qubole.
- Revoke active sessions for affected integration roles and rotate every secret, parameter and Lambda environment variable those roles could read.
- Review all activity from any suspicious role session, especially in Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store, Lambda and S3.
Written by AI from the sources, checked against them
Full story timeline · 1 update
Who reported · 1 outlet
Who and what is in it
Malware